representatives argued instead for the separation of the Rhineland and the Ruhr from Germany, or at least for the internationalization of the Ruhr so that its coal resources could be used to build up the heavy industry of Germany's neighbours and so avoid recreating Germany's former industrial domination. The US, on the other hand, did not have a common position. The War Department proposed that ownership should be vested in German trustees until a German central government was established, and the German people could vote on the issue of nationalization in more 'normal' conditions after five years. By way of contrast, the State Department supported the French position that German industry should be included in a European recovery programme. From the outset, however, the decentralization of German industry formed a key part of Allied policy. 12 In the British sector where most heavy industry was located, the initial focus was decentralization of industry, combined with a process of denazification. Thus the 'British policy in denazifying German industry was two-pronged: first, to investigate and, where a case existed, to dismiss management; second, to strengthen the role of the trade unions.' 13 From an economic point of view, the British were keen for German industry to play a vital role in ensuring German economic recovery so as to lessen the financial pressure on the UK as an occupying power. Heavy industry, particularly iron and steel which was controlled by a handful of companies, was to be restructured and broken up into smaller entities. In July 1946, Sholto Douglas, Commander of the British Zone in Germany, on the basis of plans outlined by Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, to the Cabinet early in 1946, announced plans for the eventual nationalization (or socialization as it was referred to) of the main German industries. There is doubt in the German literature as to whether the British were serious in their pursuit of nationalization 14 as the policy did not seem to correspond with the UK's economic priorities of increasing German production. Müller argues that the owners, despite not being officially involved in the negotiations over the future of heavy industry, were prepared to accept far-reaching worker involvement in management in order to garner trade-union support against British plans for the break-up of the coal, and iron and steel industries. 54 Here it has been argued, that codetermination was the result of Anglo-German co-operation that fostered solidarity between employers and workers, leading to the implementation of a union policy with the agreement of the relevant employers. 55 This thesis is not supported by all writers on the subject. For example, Nautz and Hüttenberger argue that the British were not supportive of 51 Led by E. Potthoff and K. Strohmenger. 52 Among the five worker representatives two would be nominated by the works council, two by the trade unions and one from another source. See Thum¸ Mitbestimmung, p. 36. 53 The 1952 Act provides for codetermination on the supervisory boards of companies with more than 500 employees. Employee representatives make up one-third of the members of the supervisory board in such cases. was instead made to the public corporation and the 1931 report was adopted by the Congress. 78 Nonetheless, the issue of worker representation on the boards of nationalized 73 The Bill was never adopted but a similar Bill - Bevin's antagonism towards Morrison was unconcealed. … Socialism to Bevin meant something more than planning and public ownership; it meant a change in the status of the worker, the end of that exclusion from responsibility, the stigma of inferiority, which he had always regarded as the key to improving industrial relations. The same questions over labour representation arose after the Second World War.
However, the position adopted by the TUC and the Labour Party remained virtually unchanged from its pre-war position. As Dartmann points out:
In the end, … , in spite of the fact that the discussion of labour's position regarding the control and administration of industry had started with economic and industrial developments, and in spite of the fact that therefore economic and industrial development, control of industry, and labour participation were generically linked, this link was argumentatively reduced to the question of efficient management.
Efficiency became the major yardstick for the eventual success of nationalisation and 79 For an overview of the debates see Barry, Nationalisation, pp. 320-2. 80 Letter from Bevin to Attlee in response to the draft paper on 'The While nationalized industries were under a duty to establish machinery for the settlement of terms and conditions of employment, the wording of the relevant provisions was so vague that the obligation should be considered as good practice rather than a legal 84 nationalized industry at all levels [to] be firmly adopted in practice' 98 on the basis that 'it is the negation first of all of Socialism and secondly of sanity itself to nationalise an industry and then leave the control of it in the hands of the Tories.' 99 Moreover it was argued that:
Something more than consultation must be given to the men. They should have the opportunity of appointment to managerial and supervisory positions. Only in that way are we going to get co-operation between the managerial and supervisory side and those who are supervised.
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The Association of Engineering and Shipbuilding Draughtsmen, in seconding the resolution, argued that:
[T]o nationalise an industry is not the same thing as socialising it. … We believe that the extension of the principle of industrial democracy is just as important as the extension of political democracy. … In urging that workers employed in nationalized industry should participate in management we do so because we believe that that is fundamental for industrial democracy and will increase production.
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Morrison expressed the views of the government when he disagreed with the tenor of the resolution by calling for ministers to be given 'adequate time to consolidate, to develop, to make efficient or more efficient the industries which have been socialised in the present The Unions did not want this, any more than did management, for their basic purpose was to bargain about wages and conditions. If they were part of management they would be bargaining with themselves, in other words, so far as the men were concerned they would be indistinguishable from management. [T]he development of codetermination … owed its development mainly to the interpretation of the rise of Hitler the unions arrived at immediately after the war, in which they blamed big business alone and therefore uncritically failed to provide an assessment of their own roles in the critical period leading to the Third Reich. 124 The introduction of codetermination in and of itself was therefore considered a success by German trade unions, whereas from the perspective of the British military government, influenced by a different understanding of industrial democracy, it was a stepping stone on the road to nationalization which, in Germany, was never completed. 133 The only exception to this was found in the iron and steel industry which had performed well under private ownership, thus making nationalization on purely economic grounds difficult to justify. The rationale was instead given as power; 134 the argument being that 'steel represents the largest concentration of power in the economic system.' 135 Nonetheless, nationalization of these industries faced considerably more opposition. It must be questioned whether this would have been different had nationalization been justified on the grounds of empowering workers to share in certain responsibilities for the management of these industries.
British trade unions, for the most part, also did not share the same level of distrust of employers and the state as German trade unions after the Second World War. This is partly explained by British Guild Socialism which bore little resemblance to 'the extreme anti-state views of Continental [European] syndicalist movements.' 136 The state was perceived in the UK, unlike in Germany, as being 'an instrument of freedom and progress.' 137 Nonetheless, trade-unions' narrow vision first became obvious when industries were privatized after the change of government in 1951, leaving workers with no role in the management of industry.
Even in those industries which were not immediately privatized, the selection of board members was left to the individual minister concerned, thereby providing no guarantee that workers' interests would be recognized. Such a scenario had been foreseen by those in the union movement arguing in favour of worker participation in management; 138 considered as mechanisms to collective bargaining, 144 such as codetermination, which are guaranteed by legislation. 145 One can therefore only conclude that the failure to institute a system of codetermination in the UK in the 1940s should be considered a missed opportunity for British trade unions.
In conclusion, the nationalization programme of the British post-war Labour government had a profound effect on German industrial relations; creating the necessary framework within which parity codetermination could be introduced. While nationalization in the German iron and steel industries was never achieved, codetermination has had a lasting and substantial impact on German trade unions and on the German labour law system. Parallels can be drawn with debates taking place at the same time in the UK over nationalization and workers' participation in management. However, historical differences between the British and German trade-union movements, as well as differences in the understanding of industrial democracy, resulted in the nationalization of the major industries in the UK without workers' involvement in the management of these industries.
With the benefit of hindsight and in light of the changes that occurred in the regulation of British industrial relations in the second half of the twentieth century, the failure to institute a system of codetermination in the UK in the late 1940s must be considered a missed opportunity for British trade unions.
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144 Even in the case of collective bargaining, however, Germany has a higher level of coverage due to industry-level bargaining than the UK, where collective bargaining takes place at company level. See L. Fulton, 'Worker representation in Europe' (Labour Research Department and ETUI; 2013) available at http://www.worker-participation.eu/NationalIndustrial-Relations/Across-Europe/Collective-Bargaining2. 145 In addition to their involvement in the collective-bargaining process, German trade unions have a role to play in the process of codetermination in the enterprise through works councils which is guaranteed by legislation. 
